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Abstract 
Domestic dogs are especially skillful at understanding human forms of communication. 
Evidence suggests that dogs’ skills in this domain might be an adaptation to life with 
humans and the result of selection processes during domestication. One question that has 
sparked a lot of research in recent years is to what extent dogs’ communication is in any 
way comparable to that of human infants. Here, we discuss recent research that has 
examined the extent to which dogs communicate to inform others. Communication with 
the motive to inform others is, as of yet, seen as a unique feature of human 
communication. 
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Dogs have remarkable social skills, which are considered to be to some extent 
functionally equivalent to those of humans (Marshall-Pescini & Kaminski, 2014). Dogs, 
like human infants, are very good at following visual, gestural cues provided by humans, 
such as pointing or gazing at a specific target (e.g., Hare & Tomasello, 1999; Soproni, 
Miklósi, Topál, & Csányi, 2001). Without the need of any formal training (Hare & 
Tomasello, 1999), and at a very young age (Riedel, Schumann, Kaminski, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2008), dogs’ ability to use human gestures to find a hidden reward is 
comparable to that of young children in similar settings (Lakatos, Soproni, Doka, & 
Miklósi, 2009; Topál, Gergely, Erdőhegyi, Csibra, & Miklósi, 2009). 
In addition, dogs tend to outperform their closest living relative, the wolf, even when 
both species are raised under identical conditions (Virányi et al., 2008). Unless wolves 
receive extensive and prolonged training (Udell, Dorey, & Wynne, 2008), they do not 
reach the same skills as dogs when it comes to using human communicative gestures 
(Miklósi et al., 2003). Finally, dogs do not seem to be as good at following cues to hidden 
food provided by other dogs in an experimental setting (Hare & Tomasello, 1999; Shyne, 
Singer, & Jameson, 2012). 
Taken together, this evidence led to the so-called domestication hypothesis, which 
proposes that dogs’ human-like social skills derive from dogs’ unique evolutionary past 
with humans and are an adaptation to life with humans (Hare, Brown, Williamson, & 
Tomasello, 2002). Dogs were the first species to be domesticated (Skoglund, Ersmark, 
Palkopoulou, & Dalén, 2015), and one possibility is that later during the domestication 
process, humans selected dogs for activities, such as hunting and herding, that required 
skill at following human cues (Kaminski & Nitzschner, 2013). One hypothesis is 
therefore that dogs adapted to life in the human environment by developing specific 
social skills for interacting with humans (Hare et al., 2002; Miklósi et al., 2003). This 
hypothesis is further supported by the finding that dog breeds selected for work in 
continuous visual contact with human partners (e.g., sheepdogs, gun dogs) are more 
successful in following the human pointing gesture than are dogs selected for 
independent work (e.g., hounds, underground-hunting dogs, livestock guard dogs, sled 
dogs) or non-purebred dogs (Gácsi, McGreevy, Kara, & Miklósi, 2009). 
Dogs also have the ability to referentially produce communicative behaviors (e.g., in 
order to guide a human toward a certain object; Miklósi, Polgárdi, Topál, & Csányi, 
2000). These behaviors are described as showing behavior, which includes gaze 
alternation and attention-getting behaviors that dogs use to indicate a referent (Miklósi et 
al., 2000). The showing behavior fulfills the criteria for intentionality and referentiality as 
they have been introduced for primates (Gaunet & Deputte, 2011; Leavens, 2004). 
Specifically, dogs do produce this behavior in the absence of an audience; they alternate 
gazes between the human and the referent; they use attention-getting behaviors (e.g., 
vocalizations; Miklósi et al., 2000); and they take into account the attentional state of 
their audience (Gaunet & Deputte, 2011; Marshall-Pescini, Colombo, Passalacqua, 
Merola, & Prato-Previde, 2013). 
Dogs’ flexible use of interspecific communication with humans leads to questions about 
the cognitive mechanisms underlying such skills. One question is whether dogs 
understand the informative nature of human communication or, rather, interpret it as 
imperative (i.e., telling them where to go and/or what to do; Kaminski, Neumann, Bräuer, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2011; Kaminski & Nitzschner, 2013; Topál et al., 2009). The 
question is particularly relevant given that informative communication has been 
described as a uniquely human form of communication (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, 
& Tomasello, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007). 
 
Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Informative Communication 
In human communication, imperative communication has the goal of obtaining 
something for the self by influencing someone’s behavior (e.g., a child pointing at an 
object that he or she wants to obtain; Camaioni, Perucchini, Bellagamba, & Colonnesi, 
2004). From a cognitive perspective, it requires the child to conceive of the other person 
as an animate “agent of action”—something like a “social tool” (Camaioni et al., 2004). 
By contrast, declarative communication has the goal of sharing attention and interest with 
others and influencing someone’s attentional focus by directing it to another object 
(Camaioni et al., 2004) or to the self (C. Moore & D’Entremont, 2001). From a cognitive 
perspective, declarative pointing is thought to require some understanding of others’ 
mental states (e.g., others’ intentions; Camaioni et al., 2004). Informative pointing is 
defined as a subtype of declarative gestures, which specifically refers to communicative 
acts produced with the intent to inform others about things they want or need to know 
(Liszkowski et al., 2006). Several cognitive skills need to be in place for informative 
pointing to occur. Tomasello et al. (2007) suggested that there needs to be a mutual 
understanding of the signaler’s intention to communicate. This is often signaled through 
so-called ostensive cues (e.g., eye contact and high-pitched voice; Csibra & Gergely, 
2009). There also needs to be an understanding of referential intention, which is required 
for the receiver to understand that he or she has to attend to a specific referent, and 
finally, there needs to be a motivation to be helpful and to provide information to the 
other (Tomasello et al., 2007). 
 
Informative Communication in Dogs? 
Dogs’ human-like social skills make them a good candidate for exploring whether 
human forms of communication are indeed unique (Kaminski et al., 2011). Since dogs’ 
social skills appear to be a specialization to communicative interactions with humans 
specifically, research in this area has primarily focused on dog-human communication. In 
order to be able to understand the informative aspect of communication, dogs would need 
to possess the cognitive skills required for such communication: understanding of the 
communicative intent (e.g., sensitivity to ostensive cues), a referential understanding of 
communication (Tomasello et al., 2007), and informative (helpful) motives. 
There is some evidence that might suggest that dogs understand intent—more 
specifically, communicative intent. Dogs seem to perceive human actions as goal-
directed, in that dogs differentiate human actions from the “actions” of an inanimate 
object (i.e., a box; Marshall-Pescini, Ceretta, & Prato-Previde, 2014)—although if a robot 
performs certain actions, dogs seem to accept it quickly as a “goal-directed” being, which 
suggests that dogs might attend to actions rather than intentions (Gergely et al., 2015). 
When it comes to dogs’ understanding of humans’ psychological states, results are not 
unanimous. Dogs seem to understand something about a human’s current perspective, but 
this does not seem to lead to an understanding of humans’ psychological states 
(Kaminski, Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; MacLean, Krupenye, & Hare, 2014; 
Virányi, Topál, Miklósi, & Csanyi, 2006). Dogs do, however, seem to attend to humans’ 
communicative intent. For example, dogs differentiate gestures made with 
communicative intent from random movements that resemble  pointing gestures 
(Kaminski, Schulz, & Tomasello, 2012). Different ostensive cues such as eye contact and 
tone of voice seem to help dogs identify when a human has the intent to communicate 
(e.g., Scheider, Grassmann, Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2011; Téglás, Gergely, Kupán, 
Miklósi, & Topál, 2012). 
That dogs might have some understanding of the referential nature of human 
communication was suggested by a study showing that dogs followed a human’s gaze 
toward a certain target only when it was preceded by ostensive cues (Téglás et al., 2012). 
Dogs are also sensitive to the order in which ostensive and referential signals (gestures) 
are given during a communicative interaction with humans. When the ostensive cues are 
given before the gesture, dogs attend to the gesture more than when it is the other way 
around. This may indicate that during the presentation of the ostensive cues, dogs are 
already forming referential expectations (Tauzin, Csík, Kis, Kovács, & Topál, 2015). 
Finally, dogs also use gaze alternation in a referential way during situations that require 
social referencing (i.e., seeking information from another individual regarding a target; 
Marshall-Pescini et al., 2013). However, when they see a human pointing and the referent 
of the gesture is later moved, dogs reach the location that the human indicated rather than 
the actual object. This suggests that they may understand pointing as a general indication 
of where to go rather than what to do (Tauzin, Csík, Kis, & Topál, 2015; see also 
Kaminski & Nitzschner, 2013, for a discussion of this point). 
Finally, the central question is whether dogs act based on cooperative/helpful motives. 
Dogs’ ability to follow human pointing might be partly based on their ability to 
understand the cooperative element of human communication in a way that other 
nonhuman animals do not (Kirchhofer, Zimmermann, Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2012). 
For example, a direct comparison of dogs’ performance in an object-choice task to that of 
chimpanzees, humans’ closest relative, showed that dogs were especially skilled at 
finding hidden food when they could follow human social cues (i.e., the pointing 
gesture), whereas chimpanzees performed better when they could use physical, nonsocial 
cues (i.e., noise made when a cup holding the food was shaken; Bräuer, Kaminski, 
Riedel, Call, & Tomasello, 2006). Furthermore, dogs are outstandingly good at following 
a point specifically when the gesture is used in cooperative contexts (i.e., when the 
human partner points to help the dog find a food reward; Hare & Tomasello, 1999) or is 
used to request a dog’s help in retrieving an object (Kirchhofer et al., 2012). Dogs have 
also evolved the predisposition to use gaze to communicate with humans when facing 
unsolvable problems, suggesting that they expect humans’ help (Miklósi et al., 2003). 
Moreover, dogs do not outperform chimpanzees in noncommunicative social contexts, 
meaning that dogs’ skills do not seem to extend to all social interactions but may be 
limited to cooperative, communicative contexts (Wobber & Hare, 2009). This suggests 
that dogs’ social skills possibly rely on a special receptiveness to human cooperative 
communication (Kirchhofer et al., 2012), which seems to depend on a sensitivity to 
humans’ ostensive referential signals (Topál et al., 2009). 
In a study conducted by Bräuer, Schönefeld, and Call (2013), dogs were trained to 
open a door by pushing a button. Dogs needed to be prompted to push the button by 
human communication and would not push it spontaneously. Moreover, there is evidence 
that in communicative contexts, dogs differentiate between objects based on their 
owners’ preference for one over the other, rather than their own selfish interest (Turcsán, 
Szánthó, Miklósi, & Kubinyi, 2015). Additionally, dogs have the general motivation to 
act cooperatively in response to humans’ requests. When asked to indicate the location of 
a hidden object, dogs indicated things that a person, but not they themselves, had an 
interest in; however, they then did not differentiate between an object the person was 
interested in versus an object the person was not interested in (Kaminski et al., 2011). 
There is evidence that dogs interpret human communications as directives (Kaminski et 
al., 2011; Scheider, Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2013), such as a command to fetch 
irrespective of the object (Kaminski et al., 2011). This suggests that dogs’ helpful 
indications may partly depend on the effect of social facilitation, which can suppress the 
dog’s own preferences—for example, when following human pointing, dogs chose a less 
preferred food reward indicated by a human over a reward that they preferred but that 
was not indicated (Pongrácz, Hegedüs, Sanjurjo, Kővári, & Miklósi, 2013). 
 
A Non-Mentalistic Approach to Communication 
Overall, the evidence suggests that dogs may possess some of the skills necessary 
for the understanding of communication as information. There is, however, not enough 
evidence suggesting that dogs act with helpful motives when interacting with others, and, 
in addition, there is not much evidence for dogs’ understanding of humans’ mental state 
(i.e., human perspective and state of knowledge; Kaminski et al., 2009; MacLean et al., 
2014). According to a “mentalistic” approach, this is necessary for declarative 
communication to be possible (Tomasello et al., 2007). Some authors, however, have 
challenged this mentalistic view, arguing for a non-mentalistic basis of human preverbal 
communication (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Leavens, 2004; R. Moore, 2013). The 
hypothesis here is that infants’ early pointing may be aimed at gaining positive emotional 
reactions rather than directing the attention of others to external objects, and therefore the 
understanding of others’ attention is not necessary (C. Moore & Corkum, 1994). Also, 
Gergely and Csibra (2009) suggested that human communication may rely on “natural 
pedagogy” (i.e., it is characterized by a series of elements that allow and facilitate the 
transfer of knowledge). Specifically, even very young children are sensitive to ostensive 
cues indicating to others that they are addressed in the communication (Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009). Such cues create referential expectations in the receiver (Csibra & 
Volein, 2008), which allow him or her to interpret the communication as conveying 
information that is relevant and generalizable (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). This way, the 
understanding of others’ states of mind is not required for successful declarative 
communication. Thus, the authors suggested that nonhuman animal communication 
might be more comparable to human communication than is thought by others (Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009). 
 
Directions for Future Research 
The currently available evidence on dog communication suggests that dogs posses 
some of the cognitive building blocks that need to be in place for an individual to 
communicate informatively: Dogs seem to have some understanding of humans’ 
communicative intent (Kaminski et al., 2012; Scheider et al., 2011; Téglás et al., 2012) 
and, in some situations, seem to show helpful motives and have an expectation for 
humans to act helpfully (Bräuer et al., 2013; Hare & Tomasello, 1999; Kaminski et al., 
2011; Kirchhofer et al., 2012; Miklósi et al., 2003). Findings on dogs’ understanding of 
humans’ mental states (Kaminski et al., 2009; MacLean et al., 2014; Virányi et al., 2006) 
and their understanding of referentiality (Tauzin, Csík, Kis, & Topál, 2015; Téglás et al., 
2012) are still controversial, however, and as of yet there is no convincing evidence that 
dogs show the tendency to communicate with a motive to inform (Kaminski et al., 2011). 
Future research on dogs’ understanding of human communication should focus on some 
of the aspects that remain unclear, such as dogs’ understanding of the referential nature of 
communication (Kaminski et al., 2011; Kaminski & Nitzschner, 2013; Tauzin, Csík, Kis, 
& Topál, 2015; Topál et al., 2009)—that is, understanding the relevance of the referent 
for the receiver—and should further investigate to what extent helpful motives drive 
dogs’ communication with humans (Kaminski et al., 2011). 
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